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Abstract 
 
The paper analyses how security sector reforms (SSRs) can contribute to state-
building. It is argued that successful state-building requires an endogenous 
political process which aims at creating political legitimacy instead of certain ideal 
type Western state structures. In a conflict-torn society this demands security for 
citizens – an environment in which they feel safe and protected – allowing them to 
express their opinion freely and participate in a state-building process. The 
example of the Afghan police reform illustrates that a state-centric SSR is in 
danger of delegitimising and destabilising the state. In contrast, a human-centric 
security approach is more likely to support an endogenous process of building 
legitimate institutions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“Violence can never do more than protecting the boundaries of the political realm.  
Where violence penetrates the political realm itself, that is the end of politics.”1 
Hannah Arendt (1965:20) 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the evolving danger of ‘new wars’ and 
international terrorism an increased involvement of Western countries in building 
state institutions in developing or ‘failed’ regions of the world can be observed. In 
the early 2000s the concept of ‘state-building’ and the instrument of ‘security 
sector reform’ (SSR) had already become catchwords of development, defence and 
foreign policy. By now SSRs have taken place across the world, for example, in 
Aceh, Afghanistan, Burundi, El Salvador, Colombia, Kosovo, Nepal and Southern 
Sudan. 
  
The academic discourse on state-building is determined by scholars like 
Fukuyama (2004) and Rotberg (2004) who focus on creating Western-type 
rational-legal structures which extend the state’s capacity of public good delivery 
and promise legitimacy by improved performance. However, a growing number of 
scholars such as Holsti (1996) and Lemay-Hébert (2009) argues in favour of a 
more socio-political understanding in order to ensure that institutions are 
embedded in society and have political legitimacy. Even though both streams 
regard SSR as the core instrument of building a state its contribution has never 
been fully analysed. Furthermore, the interplay of the concepts of human and state 
security which underpin the concept of SSR has rarely been looked at in this 
particular context. 
 
This paper analyses these aspects and argues that the underlying concepts of 
human and state security are not in sync in the context of SSRs in conflict-torn 
societies and have a different potential of contributing to state-building. A state 
security-centric SSR may destabilise the state on the long term by protecting 
                                                 
1 This quotation was translated by the author as it is not part of the English edition of 
Hannah Arendt’s ‘On Revolution’ which is shorter than the German one (“Die Gewalt 
kann nie mehr, als die Grenzen des politischen Bereichs schützen. Wo die Gewalt in die 
Politik selbst eindringt, ist es um die Politik geschehen.”). 
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institutions which are not embedded in society. In contrast, a human-centric 
approach is more likely to make a positive contribution by providing a safe 
environment which allows people to become involved in an endogenous process 
of building legitimate state institutions.  
 
In order to illustrate the impact of choosing human or state security as a guiding 
principle of SSR the police reform in Afghanistan is analysed. Whereas the 
European mission (EUPOL) provides trainings for police and supports a design 
which reflects a human-centric understanding and focuses on human rights, rule of 
law and accountability the US-dominated NATO mission (NTM-A) is state-centric 
which is in line with the ‘War on Terror’. Due to American dominance the police 
is predominantly designed and trained in a paramilitary way to combat terrorism 
and protect the Afghan state with its institutions which were created according to 
the interests of outside actors and the Afghan elite. Therefore, the police protects a 
state and values which are not embedded in the Afghan society and cannot provide 
security for large parts of the population. Eventually the Afghan state is 
delegitimised and the space for an endogenous process of state-building is 
severely restricted. 
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2. Building a Legitimate State by Reforming the Security Sector 
2.1 State and Legitimacy 
 
As a starting point for analysing state-building it is necessary to define what a state 
is and when it is legitimate as this understanding serves as the goal of what state-
building is supposed to achieve. In order to create a state which is embedded in 
and accepted by society not only appropriate legal structures and performance are 
required but also political legitimacy. Thus state-building should be based on a 
broad understanding of the state that acknowledges the need for an endogenous 
political process which also allows the creation of political legitimacy. 
 
Two basic streams of understanding the state and its legitimacy have to be 
differentiated in the context of state-building. The most prominent approach 
focuses on institutional reconstruction and is based on Weber’s idea of legal 
rational domination: “A compulsory political organization with continuous 
operation (politischer Anstaltsbetrieb) will be called a “state” insofar as its 
administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (Weber 1968:54; 
emphasis in the original). In order to be able to uphold the claim to the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of physical force the state has to provide security for the 
population. Thus legitimacy is seen a as means or condition for exercising 
authority. Scholars like, most prominently, Fukuyama (2004), Rotberg (2004), 
Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005) and Hippler (2004) build on this theory and 
argue that state-building should be directed at creating rational-legal structures 
which extend the state’s capacity of public good delivery in order to increase its 
legitimacy by improved performance. State-building is seen as a bureaucratic task 
of “attempting to replace one type of rules with another, so that formal 
bureaucratic rules of a Weberian type take precedence over informal rules rooted 
in patronage and clientelism” (Lister 2007:3). 
 
The Weberian theorists basically view the Western state as a universal ideal for 
social order (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010; Jackson 2011). Some authors 
even describe the absence of Western institutions as a security risk in a globalised 
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world (see Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010:35). Accordingly, societies without 
a typical state structure are often called ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ because they appear 
chaotic and without obvious institutions in place which can control violence and 
prevent it from spreading into the ‘peaceful liberal democracies’ in the West. But 
even though Western-type state structures have legitimacy in several countries, 
creating this kind of institutions does not ensure the same outcome. The reason for 
the wide-spread existence of Western state structures lies in the colonial history 
rather than in general acceptance. During the colonial period Western type state 
structures were imposed on many countries from the outside (ibid:34-36). After 
the end of the colonial period this state form became an inevitable requirement for 
participation within the international community and thus, also trade, grants, loans 
and development assistance. The consequence is that many of these societies have 
the burden of “making up for the consolidation of anticipated statehood” 2 
(Siegelberg 1991:13). Building on Risse and Lehmkuhl it has to be accepted that 
the “monopoly on the use of force and its ability to enforce political decisions (…) 
represents the exception rather than the rule in terms of both history and space” 
(2006:4). 
 
Hence it has to be questioned if legitimacy can be reduced to a means or a 
condition for exercising authority. Building on a more sociological understanding 
of the state legitimacy itself has to be recognised as a core element of state-
building and criterion of state strength as it ensures that a state is embedded in 
society. Kaldor points out that “nowadays, state weakness is first and foremost a 
legitimacy crisis“ (2009:184) which is supported by a second strand of scholars 
like Barker (1990), Buzan (1991), Holsti (1995/1996), Lemay-Hébert (2009) and 
Pegg (1998). For example, Holsti argues that the strength of the state should be 
defined as “the capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule” 
(1996:82) as a government also requires the acknowledgement of the right to 
govern (Barker 1990:56). Even though rational-legal legitimacy and performance 
legitimacy cannot be ignored in a process of state-building a state also needs a 
core political acceptance which cannot be achieved by improving performance and 
legal structures only. This acceptance is commonly termed ‘political legitimacy’ 
                                                 
2 Translated by the author from German. 
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expressing the “support for political authority” (Kaldor 2009:186) and the feeling 
of citizens that the government is trusted and has the right to govern. Political 
legitimacy derives from a public discourse and involvement in the state-building 
process which exceeds aspects of procedural democracy like elections. Thus state 
and society cannot be separated and institutions have to be seen as a vehicle 
through which people seek to exercise power and which simultaneously exercise 
power and govern behaviour (Kukathas 2008). This understanding extends the 
Weberian concept and incorporates Durkheim’s idea of the state as an “organ of 
social thought” (1957:79). Thus state-building has to be seen as a socio-political 
task which cannot be achieved by looking at institutions only. 
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2.2 State-Building in Conflict-Torn Societies 
 
The current state-building discourse is very much policy-oriented and focuses on 
the (re-)construction of institutions in conflict-torn societies. Yet especially in 
conflict-torn societies where state-building is driven by outside actors the 
construction of Weberian states is problematic and likely to create a new layer of 
institutions which is not accepted by and embedded in society. In order to create 
political legitimacy the security of citizens and officials has to be ensured, creating 
an environment in which they feel safe and protected and allowing them to express 
their opinion freely and participate in a state-building process.  
 
The current state-building discourse evolved in the 2000s from the peace-building 
debate which had been increasingly criticised by a number of scholars for under-
emphasising the creation of state institutions to achieve peace (e.g. Chesterman 
2004; Fearon/Laitin 2004; Fukuyama 2004; Krasner 2004; Paris 2004). In contrast 
to the general theoretical debate on states and their legitimacy this debate focuses 
on the reconstruction of political authority in conflict-torn societies outside Europe 
in times of a globalised world where external actors are involved actively and 
demand changes (e.g. in terms of a military intervention) (Bliesemann de 
Guevara/Kühn 2010:34). Building on Paris and Sisk this new concept can be 
summarised as “a particular approach to peacebuilding, premised on the 
recognition that achieving security and development in societies emerging from 
civil war partly depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate 
governmental institutions” (2009:1-2). 
 
Adopting the dominant approach to state-building by creating rational-legal 
structures in order to extend the state’s capacity of public good delivery and 
achieve peace is particularly problematic in a conflict-torn society. One the one 
hand, the attempt of building a Weberian state allows a straightforward 
operationalisation into policy as a clear goal is set. Thus state-building can be 
planned step by step in a project management approach with certain goals and 
milestones (e.g. improve living conditions and reform ministries) involving 
bureaucrats and military officers with mainly technical concerns. On the other 
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hand, many institutions in conflict-torn societies are likely to be based on informal 
personal ties. However, the depoliticised understanding ignores local history, 
institutions and power relations (Jackson 2011:1807). Furthermore, the involved 
international actors tend to create alliances with local elites and prominent NGOs, 
ignoring other voices in order to achieve their national interests such as global 
stability (Kouvo 2009:29-33). Building on Reno it has to be noted that  
“most intervention administrations try to build parallel state institutions to 
provide security, deliver services, and mobilize citizens’ organizations. These 
actions can duplicate or even circumvent the efforts of locally popular 
substate groups in some instances. To the extent that substate groups are shut 
out of formal programs to rebuild state institutions, some local people may 
interpret that as the political marginalization of their communities” 
(2008:144). 
Yet if a state-building process does not include society it can result in layers of 
institutions – which may be called ‘hybrid’ (e.g. Brett 2009; Lister 2007) – where 
introduced formal institutions are only the surface but where unchanged informal 
institutions govern the interaction within a society. Eventually, states are created 
which have a Western institutional façade and look like a democratic state but are 
ruled on the basis of elite-dominated informal institutions (Jackson 2011:1806). 
Thus, these states are nothing but ‘phantom states’ or ‘empty shells’ (Lemay-
Hébert 2009) that are not legitimate as they do not represent the collective interest 
of their society (Bliesemann de Guevara/Kühn 2010:49). 
 
However, building new states which have political legitimacy is not impossible. 
Building on a Habermasian understanding creating political legitimacy requires 
first of all a secure public sphere, an environment in which civil society can 
discuss the rules governing relations. As Arendt points out this political realm has 
to be secure and in case of need has to be protected with violence in order to allow 
politics to take place (Arendt 1965:20). Applied to the context of state-building 
Rubin notes that “building legitimate institutions requires sufficient security for 
unarmed citizens and nonmilitary officials to participate” (2008:34) and similarly 
Kaldor argues that “security, in the sense of protection from violence, is at the 
heart of political legitimacy” (2009:188). Therefore, the international community 
could provide the required security in order to enable societies to create 
institutions endogenously which have political legitimacy. In contrast, technocratic 
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international approaches have to be considered as being one reason why state-
building fails rather than being a valuable contribution. Yet also the difficulties of 
this endogenous approach have to be considered. Even though creating a secure 
public sphere is theoretically possible and feasible it requires international actors 
to put back their normative and strategic interests and allow a process of 
endogenous state-building without knowing how long it will take and what the 
result will look like. Nevertheless, it can contribute to the creation of a more 
stabile international community and, therefore, fulfils the international interests on 
a long term.           
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2.3 Security Sector Reform: Human vs. State Security 
 
In parallel to the rise of the state-building concept the idea of reconstructing the 
security sector has evolved since the 1990s and was coined ‘security sector 
reform’ (SSR) in 1998 by Clara Short, the first British Minister for International 
Development (Brzoska 2003; Sedra 2010). The security sector may include “all 
those organisations which have authority to use, or order the use of, force, or the 
threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures 
that are responsible for their management and oversight” (Chalmers 2000:6). This 
broad definition incorporates the variety of understandings as, for example, in 
some but not all cases besides classic components like the police, intelligence and 
military also the judicial system is included. The concept’s origin in foreign, 
development and defence policy rather than academia still influences the current 
discourse. Even though SSR could be used to describe any reform of the security 
sector the term is predominantly referred to as the core instrument of state-
building policy conducted by developed countries ‘abroad’ in conflict-torn society 
rather than ‘at home’ in developed countries (Sedra 2010:17; Hänggi 2004). 
Hence, the strong influence of external actors – like development agencies, 
military forces, private security firms and warlords – in the process can be seen as 
main characteristics of SSRs (Jackson 2010:120). It also lacks an agreed 
understanding of SSR and what the priorities should be as politicians and 
international organisations customise the concept according to their political 
interest (Hendrickson/Karkoszka 2002). However, the core goal of SSRs which is 
usually brought forward can be summarised as contributing to state-building by 
achieving “efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a 
framework of democratic governance” (Hänggi 2004:3; see also e.g. Ball et al. 
2003; DFID 2003:30, OECD/DAC 2001:II-35; Wulf 2004). 
 
Despite the popularity of SSR as a policy there are only few academic studies on 
this concept (Jackson 2011:1804). The claim regarding the importance of SSR in 
the context of state-building which is brought forward by donors and international 
organisations (e.g. DFID 2003:30; OECD/DAC 2001:II-35; UN Security Council 
2007) has never been fully analysed and the relation between the underlying 
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concepts of human and state security has never been looked at in this context 
(Jackson 2011:1804). Building on Peake et al. and Jackson it has to be noted that 
the SSR debate is characterised by a “benign analytical neglect” 
(Peake/Scheye/Hills 2008) and “begins to look more like a constructed mythology 
than a coherent theory” (Jackson 2010:130). Even though state and human security 
can be seen as complementary concepts the relationship can be problematic in the 
context of conflict-torn societies which questions the core of the SSR concept. 
 
The idea of state security which is also termed ‘national security’ evolved with 
emerging nation states in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Its 
understanding has varied according to the evolution of the nation state over the 
past centuries from a concept which focused on borders, war and military matters 
to the “absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers 1952:483) and the 
protection of national institutions (Paleri 2008:51-61). The idea of human security 
reflects a paradigm shift as it challenges these traditional notions of security by 
focusing on the human being as the subject which has to experience security rather 
than the state, the nation or other institutions. The current discourse is dominated 
by three different streams of understanding human security. On the one hand, the 
broadest definition is based on the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994 
which coined the term ‘human security’, describing security as a condition for 
development. This developmental understanding of human security includes seven 
core elements ranging from economic to food, health, and political security 
(UNDP 1994). On the other hand, the narrowest definition is closely associated 
with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and was adopted by the 
Canadian government. It focuses on the protection of people from large-scale 
violence like genocide and ethnic cleansing (e.g. Pitcher 2009). In the context of 
SSR and state-building, however, a understanding is required which is open to 
compromise and acknowledges the long-term development perspective but is 
focused on ensuring the physical security of human beings in conflictual 
environments. The third stream of understanding ‘human security’ which is based 
on a concept outlined by Kaldor emphasizes these aspects and focuses on the 
prevention of violence and the creation of an environment where people feel safe 
(Kaldor 2007; Kaldor et al. 2007; Kaldor et al. 2004). 
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Depending on the context and chosen definition of human and state security the 
relationship between the concepts has to be assessed differently (e.g. Alkire 
2003:31-35; Dulic 2009; Law 2005). In a liberal democratic society the theories 
are usually understood as being in sync and in a relationship of dependency. From 
a Hobbesian point of view, for instance, which sees the sovereign state as the 
primary provider of security, everybody is secure as long as the state is secure 
(Krause 2007:13-15; Tadjbakhsh 2005:28). However, in contrast to the general 
perception that the two concepts are mutually reinforcing each other (e.g. 
Lawrence 2012:24) in the context of SSRs the relationship between human and 
state security can be problematic. Contradictions may appear as external actors 
and national elites are the key players in a country’s state-building process. A 
focus on state security consequently ensures the protection of values and 
institutions that reflect the conception of outside actors and elites as well as the 
physical security of these particular groups. The state monopoly of violence might 
even be directed against most of the citizens in order to ensure the survival of an 
artificial state or to extract resources from society (Law 2005:15). As Law points 
out “the crux of the problem is that states tend to seek security for governments 
and elites, as opposed to the people that they are supposed to serve” (ibid.). In 
contrast, providing human security gives people freedom to create their own 
institutions on the expense of the protection of the existing state institutions. It also 
reduces the influence of external actors and national elites which are required to 
ensure state security on the long term. The tension between human and state 
security in the context of SSR therefore reflects the clash in state-building between 
enabling local ownership of the process and fulfilling the dominant interests and 
norms of outside actors and elites like planning certainty, stability and the 
compliance with norms (Jackson 2011:1809). Jackson illustrates that 
“international donors are very keen to see states adopt transparency and 
accountability, but (...) the citizenry may prefer to be safe” (ibid.) – at least on the 
short term. Thus, building on Wulf, it can be summarised that “the people-centred 
concept of human security ideally complements, but often contrasts or competes 
with the notion of state security, or even more narrowly the security of the political 
elite” (2004:2). 
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2.4 Contribution of Human and State Security based approaches to State-
Building 
 
The tension between human and state security inherent in the concept of SSR 
requires that policy makers decide what to focus on. However, the two 
conceptions of security have different potentials of contributing to state-building. 
A focus on state security reflects the depoliticised Weberian approach to state-
building and can destabilise the state and contribute negatively to a more 
sustainable process of building a state from the inside. In contrast, a focus on 
human security is more likely to allow an endogenous process of state-building 
which can create political legitimacy.  
 
Conducting a state-centric SSR seems to be a welcome policy choice for 
international actors as it promises to fulfil their interests like controlling violence 
and preventing it from spreading by protecting newly created or apparently stabile 
existing institutions against enemies. Even though this is commonly seen as a 
technocratic exercise (see Jackson 2011) the impact is highly political and likely to 
destabilise a state and therefore also contradicting international actors’ interests in 
the long term.  
A main reason for the negative contribution of a state-centric SSR to state-building 
is that it is likely to protect institutions which are not embedded in society. If state 
security is the primary goal and the first step in the attempt of building a state it 
can only ensure the protection of institutions which either existed before – and in a 
conflict-torn society are likely to be dominated by local strongmen – or which are 
imposed simultaneously by the international community in cooperation with the 
local elites. Thus this approach reflects a Weberian understanding of legitimacy as 
a means to an end. If the legitimacy is derived from the outside and elites it might 
allow the government to exercise authority without being accepted by major parts 
of the population which might even consider the state as extractive and abusive. 
However, as a consequence, the state lacks political legitimacy causing state 
weakness. The Weberian idea of increasing the performance legitimacy of the state 
by capacity building measures in the security sector, like handing out guns and 
providing trainings, is likely to raise the oppressive capacity of a state even further 
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and can reduce the state’s accountability and acceptance. Particularly problematic 
in the context of state building is, additionally, the outlined negative impact on 
human security by protecting imposed institutions. Thus, eventually, the state is 
not only delegitimised but also the space for civil society to meet and voice 
concerns without danger is restricted, making an endogenous state-building 
process difficult or impossible. 
 
Furthermore, the depoliticised idea of state-centric SSRs that protecting the state 
and increasing the state’s capacity contributes to successful state-building is built 
on the questionable assumption of ‘the state’ being the only possible legitimate 
provider of security. Lawrence notes that “in both practice and theory, state-
building tends to associate the state with order and stability and the non-state with 
chaos and insecurity, but this often distorts a more complex reality” (2012:5-6; see 
also Stepputat et al. 2007:11). In the absence of formal state-institutions often 
informal institutions exist which provide a basic degree of security but are, 
however, often determined by different norms and not necessarily based on the 
Western understanding of human rights (Fitz-Gerald 2004:8). This became, for 
example, apparent in Haiti, Sierra Leone and even more striking in Charles 
Taylor’s ‘Taylorland’ in the northern part of Liberia (ibid.). Therefore, a state-
centric SSR despite being considered a bureaucratic exercise is always political 
due to its impact on local power relations. Reno and Stepputat point out that the 
attempt of creating or extending a state’s monopoly of violence challenges other 
actors who legitimise themselves by providing security (Reno 2008:156–168; 
Stepputat et al. 2007:5). Hence, extending the formal central state’s influence by 
conducting a state-centric SSR necessarily requires the state to either enter into a 
power-sharing agreement with non-state actors or to reduce the power of non-state 
actors with violent means (ibid.). Replacing these informal security institutions 
with more formal and central state-based ones can therefore undermine public 
support and cause backlashes as well as an even higher degree of insecurity (Sedra 
2010:108). Thus, the state is delegitimised further and the space for civil society to 
participate in an endogenous process of building legitimate institutions becomes 
even more restricted. 
 
                                              Page 18 of 47                                                  
 
 
 
However, an SSR can also contribute to building a state in a way that 
acknowledges the socio-political dimension and the necessity of creating political 
legitimacy. Building on Patel this requires an SSR to “build the integrity of the 
security system, promote its legitimacy, as well as empower citizens, in order to 
transform an overall abusive system into one that both respects and promotes 
human rights” (2010:278). Hence the SSR has to be approached in a human-
centric way, “emphasizing the security of individual citizens rather than 
governments or regimes” (Sedra 2010:104). Law points out that  
“without a functional security sector, the state will not be able to provide the 
secure environment that is required to realize human security goals. Similarly, 
unless guided by a human security perspective, security sector reform risks 
generating a security sector that is not accountable to those it is supposed to 
serve and that can act oppressively towards them” (2005:20). 
Some scholars criticise this idea and argue that is built on the assumption of 
‘liberal peace’ that human security will prevent all conflicts and dangers (see 
Lawrence 2012:24). However, by adopting human security principles as a guiding 
framework an SSR can contribute to creating an environment which is more 
secure, allowing civil society to interact freely and become involved in a state-
building process. Thus this approach enables civil society to create the kind of 
state institutions they want and accept, ensuring that the institutions also have 
political legitimacy. Even though this certainly does not guarantee peace it makes 
it more likely. Lawrence even argues that SSRs should aim at ‘non-state building’, 
improving the performance of existing non-state security providers in order to 
ensure human security (Lawrence 2012). Yet, more radical approaches like this 
one are in danger of favouring local elites and approaches despite possible 
violations of basic human rights. 
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2.5 Policy Dimension: EU vs. USA 
 
On the policy level the differences between a human and state security focus in 
SSR can be seen when comparing the European with the American understanding.  
Operationalised into donors’ policies a state security approach to SSR is more 
pragmatic and short-term focused protecting the created state and its institutions 
from enemies. A human security approach, in contrast, has to be context specific, 
being guided by the intended effect of human security provision rather than fixed 
understandings of particular 'good' structures. Under specific circumstances, for 
example, informal security provision can achieve better results than a formal 
security sector. Rubin points out that “political interests affect the definition of 
security objectives and hence priorities among security tasks” (2008:39). Whereas 
the European SSR policy evolved from a human-centric development discourse 
the American approach is determined by the state-centric ‘War on Terror’. 
Consequently the US prioritises hard security and military training as part of 
counterterrorism in contrast to the EU which focuses more on aspects like rule of 
law and democratisation. 
 
The term ‘SSR’ evolved in British development policy and subsequently the 
development communities have been the key players in the further evolution of the 
concept within the EU (Albrecht et al. 2010:77; Wulf 2004). Thus an 
understanding was adopted in the OECD’s key documents (see OECD 2005/2007) 
guiding the EU’s SSR policy which predominantly sees SSRs as a pillar of 
development assistance and can be characterised as human-centric and ‘holistic’ 
(Ekengren/Simons 2011:6). It includes policy, judiciary, military and intelligence, 
is in favour of civil society support and argues for a ‘multi-layered’ approach 
which acknowledges that non-state actors often are de facto providers of security 
(Scheye/McLean 2006; Albrecht et al. 2010:77). However, this understanding is 
also criticised for ‘developmentalising security’ within international relations 
(Schnabel 2012:44-46). 
 
In contrast, the US conception of SSR is state-centric and determined by foreign 
policy focusing on counter-terrorism. The attacks of 9/11 sounded the bell for the 
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‘War on Terror’ and for a process Sherman describes as a ‘militarisation of foreign 
policy’ (2010:59). Hence SSRs are predominantly seen as an instrument to support 
the fight of those who are perceived as enemies of the USA and the state 
institutions which are created in the context of state-building efforts. These 
enemies can be neighbouring countries but also insurgents within a country who 
do not accept the created institutions. Thus SSRs are closely tied to exit strategies 
after international interventions and are supposed to prepare national forces to take 
over the tasks of American soldiers (Albrecht et al. 2010). The approach can be 
therefore be characterised as “technocratic” (Jackson 2011:1806), pragmatic and 
short-term focused.  
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3. Methodology 
 
In order to illustrate the impact of choosing human or state security as a guiding 
principle of SSR on state-building the police reform in Afghanistan is analysed. 
The case study is based on primary as well as secondary research. Information on 
the general perception of the Afghans on the police and security was gained from 
secondary resources, mainly surveys which were conducted by UNDP and The 
Asia Foundation. However, the results of perception surveys in Afghanistan which 
are based on large samples have to be treated with caution. The surveys are rarely 
representative as they can only be conducted in secure areas like province capitals. 
Furthermore, results are falsified as people are often afraid of participating and 
researchers are usually paid per completed survey form (Wardak, interview 
05/07/2012). Thus, in order to confirm the impressions obtained from the surveys 
further information was gathered by conducting personal interviews with involved 
officials as well as civil society representatives who are meant to be the driving 
force of the Afghan state-building process. These exploratory interviews were 
conducted in a semi-structured way. The results extend the available survey-based 
information as they provide an in-depth impression of the problems which are seen 
by the involved internationals as well as Afghans in the context of reforming the 
police. Yet the information obtained still is limited as the selection of interview 
partners was restricted due to availability and language requirements. All 
interview partners agreed on their statements being used, however, some 
interviewees did not agree to being quoted or referred to by name, position or a 
specific quote (see Appendix for a list of the interviewees as well as the consent 
forms). Thus the information used does not always mention the people who 
provided it. 
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4. The Afghan Police Reform 
4.1 State-Building and Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan  
 
“The Americans teach the police how to shoot.  
The Europeans teach the police when not to shoot.” 
(common saying in Kabul) 
 
The analysis of literature has shown that the Weberian approach to state-building 
is problematic in the context of conflict-torn societies as the created institutions 
might lack political legitimacy and are unlikely to be embedded in society. In 
theory more holistic alternatives are on the rise which focus on more endogenous 
processes of building state institutions. However, it has not been fully analysed yet 
how SSRs as the main instrument of state-building can actually contribute 
successfully and what the impact of a human or state security focus is. This essay 
argues that a state-centric SSR is likely to destabilise the state, reflecting a 
Weberian understanding and contributing negatively to state-building on the long 
term. In contrast, a human-centric approach is more likely to make a positive 
contribution by opening up space for endogenous state-building processes. This, 
however, is less feasible in foreign policy and, therefore, more difficult to achieve 
in practice.  
 
Afghanistan serves as a useful case study to illustrate the argument as it has 
recurrent state crises (see e.g. Giustozzi 2009:69-80) and is the largest 
international project of state-building with a strong focus on SSR. The USA alone 
has spent an estimated $89.48 billion on reconstructing the Afghan state since 
2002 (SIGAR 2012:53). But the EU is also involved and has committed some €8 
billion (community and member states combined) for the period 2002-2010 which 
allows a comparison of the different approaches in reforming the security sector 
(EU 2009:1). Due to this exceptionally high international engagement and 
Afghanistan’s long history of war the results of this case study certainly are 
difficult to compare and therefore of limited explanatory power for other contexts. 
However, the results are not meant to be transferrable but rather serve as an 
example illustrating the impact of focusing either on human or state security in 
SSRs on a state-building process. The police reform as a component of SSR is a 
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particularly vivid example showing how different guiding principles translate into 
practice and eventually affect the state-building process. Whereas the military 
reform is mainly conducted by the USA alone both the EU and the USA are 
involved in reforming the police with contrary approaches. However, as there is a 
dominance of the USA the Afghan police is designed to participate in counter-
insurgency activities and trained in a paramilitary way. Hence, the police protects 
a state and values which reflect outside actors’ and the Afghan elite’s interests but 
cannot ensure security for major parts of the population. This state-centric 
approach to SSR reduces the trust of the Afghan population in the police and 
eventually the state and reduces the space for civil society to become involved in 
state-building. 
 
After the 9/11 attacks the Bush administration and its coalition partners began the 
global ‘War on Terror’ with the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 
October 2001. Once the Taliban regime was toppled an ‘International Conference 
on Afghanistan’ with some of the Taliban opposition key figures and members of 
the international community took place in the German city of Bonn in December 
2001 in order to decide on how to organise the country’s future. The conference 
resulted in the ‘Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending 
the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ – which is also 
known as the ‘Bonn Agreement’ – as a road map for building a democratic state. 
However, the Bonn Agreement and subsequent approaches emphasised the 
process of building a democratic state structure rather than a democratic substance. 
Tadjbakhsh and Schoiswohl point out that “by being formalistic and institution-
based, they remained remote from the daily realities of the people and thus 
remained top-down approaches dependent on popular ‘buying-in’” (2008:259). 
The USA made democracy – which was explicitly defied in a procedural way as 
having an elected government – as the goal of state-building in Afghanistan in 
order to create a stronghold against terrorism and allow the withdrawal of the 
American forces (Rubin 2006:184). At a G8 conference in Geneva in 2002 the 
main international actors who were involved in Afghanistan agreed on conducting 
an SSR and introduced a ‘lead nation’ approach. Under this plan the US was 
assigned to reform the army, Germany the police and Italy the judiciary while 
Britain became engaged in counternarcotics and the UN in the demobilisation.  
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4.2 The EU – A Human Security Approach to Reforming the Afghan Police 
 
Building on the German approach the EU has been involved since 2007 in creating 
an Afghan police which is integrated and supported by civil society, serving the 
Afghan people. Thus, the current concept with its focus on human rights and 
literacy reflects a human-centric conception of SSR. Due to the comparatively low 
funding and small number of delegated European police officers the strategy, 
however, is superimposed by the US approach. 
 
Police development assistance had already been provided by the Federal Republic 
of Germany as well as the German Democratic Republic in Afghanistan in the 
1960s and 1970s (Bayley/Perito 2010:19). During the intervention of the USSR a 
Soviet police system was introduced which was built on a two-track system of 
career officers and short-term patrolmen who served in the police force instead of 
joining military service (ibid.). In 2002, however, after many years of war, only 
about 50,000 police officers were left who were mostly illiterate (an estimated 70-
90%), untrained and ill-equipped (Farid Hamidi, interview 24/07/2012). 
Furthermore, most people were working for local strongmen rather than the 
national government (Bayley/Perito 2010:19). Germany as the leading nation for 
the police reform attempted to introduce a European-type police training including 
a three-year university-like education for a high rank track and a one-year training 
for officers in a middle rank scheme (ibid:20). Yet Germany sent only nine 
instructors in 2002, increasing the number to 74 in 2005, investing only €13 
million in the first year and even less in the following years in the creation of the 
Afghan National Police (ANP) (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11). Despite the 
Afghan Interim Authority’s aim of creating a police force of 70,000 officers by 
2006 only 3,600 police officers had been trained by Germany up to then 
(Bayley/Perito 2010:20; Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11). 
 
Due to these shortcomings in 2007 a European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) 
was set up and became the ‘lead nation’ in police assistance in order to support the 
German efforts with officers from other European countries (Behr 2012:44-45; 
Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:13). EUPOL’s official goal is “to support the 
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Government of Afghanistan in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of 
law, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity” 
(EU 2010:1). A senior EUPOL officer summarised the overarching goal as 
“transforming a green into a blue police” (EUPOL official, interview 01/07/2012), 
thus, turning a militarized force into a community police where decision makers 
are accountable to society.  
 
In order to achieve this EUPOL provides different trainings and programmes 
which are either funded by the EU or national governments, predominantly 
Germany and the Netherlands. A core pillar of the European mission is, for 
example, a training for senior officers and train-the-trainer programmes which 
address issues like conflict management, leadership and media relations. 
According to EUPOL an estimated 4,000 officers had attended a course at the 
‘Police staff college’ until July 2012 (EUPOL 2012:2). Additional literacy courses 
which last one year and can be attended voluntarily on a part-time basis are 
offered by the German development organisation GIZ. In July 2012 5,500 officers 
had finished one of the literacy courses while a further 7,200 were in training (GIZ 
official, interview 04/07/2012). Furthermore, EUPOL attempts to transform the 
units of particular police districts from extractive into serving police units by 
introducing principles of community-based policing with additional training and 
mentoring in order to achieve a ‘police service’ (EUPOL 2012:2). This has 
happened, for example, in Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Bamyan. A third pillar of 
EUPOL Afghanistan is the rule of law, addressing a demand which is brought 
forward by civil society organisations (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The project 
‘Coordination of Police and Prosecutor (CoPP)’ is supposed to offer joint trainings 
for police officers and prosecutors in order to enhance cooperation and the 
coordination of procedures (EUPOL 2012:2). In addition, the police detective TV 
series ‘Detective Amanullah’ is produced whose broadcasting by Ariana Television 
Network (ATN) started in June 2012. The TV crime story is to explain how police 
works and build trust by presenting typical police tasks like dealing with 
corruption, domestic violence or environmental pollution (EUPOL official, 
interview 01/07/2012; GIZ official, interview 04/07/2012). Even though the 
EUPOL approach can be considered an important step towards human security its 
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reach has to be questioned as the number of international EUPOL staff varies 
between 350 and 400 only with an annual budget of €50 to €60 million (EUPOL 
official, interview 01/07/2012; Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). Thus the well-
funded American approach is dominantly shaping the Afghan police forces. 
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4.3 The USA – A State Security Approach to Reforming the Afghan Police 
 
The current involvement of the USA in the Afghan police reform is a striking 
example of the implementation of a state security approach. Due to the priority of 
fighting terrorism the US is predominantly interested in stabilising the co-created 
and now existing state of Afghanistan with its current institutions, but 
subordinating their accountability as well as how the underlying power relations 
affect the people. Thus, the police reform is approached in a technical way with a 
focus on extending the capacity of the forces by providing weaponry and training 
the police officers in handling them.  
 
Due to the looming slow progress and the fact that Germany did not train low rank 
officers the USA started an additional police training called ‘Combined Security 
Transition Command–Afghanistan’ (CSTC-A) for building and training the 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in 2003 investing $224 million in the 
first year (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:11). 20,000 police officers underwent the 
comparatively cost-efficient American training until 2004 allowing to achieve a 
total number of 71,147 trained officers in July 2007. However, the quality 
standards were much lower compared to the German programme. Most trainees 
were selected without vetting and received a five-week training by untrained 
English-speaking instructors of the private security company DynCorp with poorly 
trained translators (ibid:12). Due to the additional problem of illiteracy most 
officers still cannot perform basic police tasks like writing reports (Bayley/Perito 
2010:21). In 2009 CSTC-A was integrated into a US dominated NATO Training 
Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) as part of the NATO military command structure 
with the purpose of uniting training components of all countries conducting police 
trainings besides the EU (Friesendorf/Krempel 2011:23). Due to these efforts the 
number of ANP officers had increased to 149,642 by March 2012 
(Livingston/O’Hanlon 2012:6) so that there were 491.92 ANP officers per 100,000 
population which is one the highest rates in the world and well above the mean of 
341.8 (Harrendorf/Smit 2011:135-36). However, the policing quality of the 
graduate police officers and, therefore, the quality of the American approach in 
general still has to be questioned. 
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The NTM-A is officially supposed to increase “the capacity of Afghan security 
forces in order gradually to hand over lead responsibility for security to the 
Afghans” (NATO 2010:1). The main mechanism for training the forces of the ANP 
has been the Focused District Development (FDD) programme in which all 
officers are withdrawn from a certain district at a time for a two-month training 
(Friesendorf 2011:85). During these two months the officers receive new weapons 
such as 9 mm pistols, AK-47s, light machine guns as well as RPGs (ibid:86). Out 
of the eight weeks of training seven weeks provide the officers with military 
tactics and skills like the use of weapons, reducing literacy and basic police 
training to one week (ibid.). Friesendorf points out that furthermore “training on 
community and democratic policing as well as domestic violence and women’s 
rights was removed from the FDD curriculum and replaced by military training” 
(ibid.). This concept of building and strengthening the ANP can therefore be 
summarised as an approach of militarisation, creating a paramilitary police force. 
A senior EUPOL officer summarised the US approach as “conducting an infantry 
training in order to create an infantry division” (EUPOL official, interview 
01/07/2012). 
 
In 2010 the Afghan Local Police (ALP) was created with support from the USA 
which is meant to consist of “village watch teams representative of, and 
accountable to (…) local communities that seek to defend themselves against the 
insurgents” (NATO 2010:2) in order to “compensate for shortfalls in the ANP” 
(ibid.). The idea of community policing is not new in Afghanistan as it has a 
tradition in certain parts of the country. So called ‘arbakai’ – which means 
‘guardian’ in Pashtun and ‘army’ in Arabic – is a tradition which was imported to 
the Pashtun south-eastern region of Afghanistan during the Osman period (Rafiee, 
interview 05/07/2012). Predominantly old men who could not work anymore 
joined the arbakai and ensured the security of communities (ibid.). After the fall of 
the Taliban in 2001 many local strongmen in the south-east re-created arbakai 
forces to fill the power vacuum (Schmeidl/Karokhail 2009:320). These strongmen 
brought forward the idea of formally introducing the ALP which was accepted by 
commanders from the north under the condition of receiving forces themselves 
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(Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The USA supports 
this approach and can be considered as the major driver of creating a countrywide 
local police as a counterinsurgency force and a means of their exit strategy 
allowing to create stability in rural areas and hand over the control of security to 
Afghans (HRW 2011:4). Even though the Afghan government has a target of 
hiring 10,000 officers for the ALP the USA approved the funding for 30,000 
people (ibid.). Usually ALP officers receive weapons and a three-week training, 
however, no clear directives about their power and rights exist and they are only 
accountable towards the local commander (ibid:5).  
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4.4 The Afghan Police – Ensuring whose security? 
 
The consequence of US dominance in reforming the Afghan police – hence the 
impact of a state-centric approach to reforming the security sector on society – 
becomes apparent by looking at how the police and security situation is perceived 
in Afghanistan. Many Afghans see the ANP not only as a helpful service but also 
as a source of danger and insecurity. The ALP is looked at even more critically and 
is understood as a means for warlords to rearm rather than a local security 
provider. Thus the Afghan police is often not improving human security but 
reducing it. 
 
The opinion of the Afghan society on the police is explored in a yearly ‘Police 
Perception Survey’ which is conducted by UNDP. The 2011 report points out that 
81% of the Afghans express personal respect for the ANP and 77% express a 
favourable opinion of the ANP overall (UNDP 2011:3-6). Yet, the report also 
illustrates that 17% of the interviewees or one member of their household 
experienced excessive physical force by an ANP member in the past year (UNDP 
2011:20). About as many of the questioned people were falsely accused of crimes 
by the ANP (ibid.). Interviewed representatives from the civil society confirmed 
that people in Afghanistan are often subject to insecurity caused by the police as 
officers commit crimes in order to improve their financial situation with their 
subsequent involvement (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 
05/07/2012; Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012). In one case, for example, the head 
of police in a province fired a rocket into the house of a member of parliament and 
arrested an unrelated but wealthy person afterwards who was released after paying 
$200,000 (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Furthermore, interviewees complained 
that the police forces were involved in the “huge business” (ibid.) of kidnapping 
(Wardak, interview 05/07/2012; Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012; Najafizada, 
interview 04/07/2012). Thus, the police are often perceived as a danger rather than 
a trustworthy institution. Najafizada summarises “when I see the police I really 
don’t feel more secure, sometimes I even feel less secure” (interview 04/07/2012). 
Hence, many people prefer to solve problems in their local jirgas or shuras in 
order to avoid dealing with the ANP (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). 
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The police further contributes to insecurity due to its role as a counterinsurgency 
force. Interviewed people noted that the ANP and the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) cannot be differentiated clearly (Najafizada, interview 04/07/2012; Reid, 
interview 05/07/2012). Even though the ANA is a much more accepted institution 
than the ANP their function is perceived as very similar as both run check-points, 
fight insurgents in mountainous areas and conduct raids. The international 
engagement of fighting insurgents with the police has direct negative effects as 
civilians are the main victims of the attacks by both sides. Human right abuses and 
corruption caused by the police as well as impunity for government forces fuel 
insurgency further (HRW 2011:4). Thus the estimated number of civilian 
casualties caused by the opposing forces increased from less than 1,000 in 2006 to 
more than 3,000 in 2011 (Livingston/O’Hanlon 2012:15). 
 
The newly created ALP is perceived even more critically than the ANP. Even 
though arbakai are acknowledged as a part of the Afghan tradition in certain 
regions the transfer of this custom to other parts of the country with different 
cultures is not supported (Niazi, interview 04/07/2012). The ALP is seen as a 
means for warlords to increase their power and receive weapons for free from the 
government rather than as a force ensuring security for communities (Wardak, 
interview 05/07/2012; Niazi, interview 04/07/2012). Even if the ALP officers are 
trained and know about human rights this does not always make them act 
differently as they are only accountable to and dependent on their local warlord 
(Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). Apparently warlords like Dostum even started 
their own ‘Taliban’ groups to justify the need for an ALP in the areas they control 
(ibid.). Warlords in the south of the country collaborate with the Taliban and 
promise not to fight them although accepting the weapons from the government 
and international actors. This happened, for example, in the province of Wardak 
where the local strongman is a former Talib and where the first ALP programme 
was started (ibid.). As joining the police forces is not respected in the Afghan 
society and seen as the last option for unemployed people already, joining the ALP 
is seen as a promising position because the weapons received there can be used for 
other purposes (ibid.). A government official interviewed by HRW noted: “We’ve 
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had these arbakis for 30 years. Who were Gulbuddin, Massood, Dostum? All 
arbakis… But this is their way of making money (…). The problem is that most of 
these people are uneducated, and they have weapons in their hands, so they can do 
what they want” (2011:31). 
 
Thus the Afghan police can be characterised as a force which is contributing 
negatively to human security rather than ensuring it. Except for data of 
international organisations on opium cultivation no crime statistics have been 
published in Afghanistan in the past years but the perceived security situation 
paints a gloomy picture. According to a survey conducted by The Asia Foundation 
56% of the people questioned say they fear for their personal safety in their local 
area (The Asia Foundation 2011:27). 22% report that they or someone in their 
family became a victim of crime in the past year (ibid:28). These are particularly 
high rates considering the bias that surveys are generally conducted in safer areas. 
According to The Asia Foundation insecurity is seen as the biggest problem in 
Afghanistan by 38% of the interviewees (ibid:23). This perceived insecurity in 
Afghanistan is not only caused by ‘insurgents’ or ‘anti-government elements’ but 
also government forces are responsible for a large number of the reported crime 
and human rights abuses. Thus, having more armed officers even further reduces 
the perceived security in the Afghan society (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). 
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4.5 Contribution of the Afghan Police Reform to State-Building 
 
The police reform in Afghanistan illustrates the conflict between the concepts of 
human and state security in the context of SSR and the negative impact SSRs 
focusing on state-security can have on state-building. Whereas the USA attempts 
to construct a police which can be used for protecting the created state institutions 
and fighting insurgents who are perceived as the enemies of these institutions, the 
European mission has an opposing goal of forming a police force which is 
accountable towards the Afghan people rather than local strongmen or 
international troops. Due to the American dominance, however, the police is 
designed and trained in fighting insurgents in cooperation with military forces 
which has blurred the border between these entities. Yet these state institutions 
were not constructed by the Afghan society but from the outside, according to 
strict timetables and blueprints in order to create a stabile and democratic-looking 
state structure quickly achieving domestic goals which are determined by domestic 
politics of outside actors (Theors/Kaldor 2011:36; Tadjbakhsh/Schoiswohl 2008). 
The view of the population and the creation of political legitimacy were largely 
ignored. Thus the protection of these institutions is in the interest of international 
actors and the Afghan elite but not of the general Afghan society (Kouvo 2009:29-
33). Consequently a gap between society and state has evolved as society 
perceives the state as an alien body and the ruling government as an international 
puppet which are in line with outside actors’ interests but do not reflect the Afghan 
society’s conception and can rarely achieve positive changes for Afghans 
(Tadjbakhsh/Schoiswohl 2008:253). 
 
The state security approach which is reflected in the narrow focus of the police 
training on fighting and the design of the ANP as a paramilitary counter-
insurgency unit enhances the extractive and oppressive capacity of the state. 
Commanders in the ministry and the police use these forces to make money via 
corruption and kidnapping, lower-rank officers rely on bribes due to their low 
salaries (Wardak, interview 05/07/2012). The US support for the founding of the 
ALP illustrates the danger of the depoliticised approach which evolves from a 
state-security focus. In order to stabilise the current state and fight terrorism the 
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rearmament of non-state actors is encouraged without questioning their political 
role within the central state. Even though a local police does not look like a typical 
Weberian institution at the first glance its creation reflects the focus on 
performance while ignoring political legitimacy. Eventually, this form of power-
sharing might keep the current central state together on the short term, however, it 
is likely to be destabilising on the long term as it allows warlords to suppress the 
people in the areas they control and fight for power and influence after the 
international military withdrawal with even more weapons. As the majority of the 
people encounters the state in the form of the police every action of the police 
shapes the people’s perception of the state (Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). The 
current role and perceived negative behaviour of the police, therefore, further 
delegitimises the state in Afghan society. Furthermore, the dominant focus on state 
security also causes a lack of human security in Afghanistan, limiting the secure 
environment for civil society to become involved in a state-building process. Thus, 
the continuing focus on state security is in danger of contradicting the successes 
achieved and harming the process of building a legitimate Afghan state from the 
inside. 
 
A human security approach to reforming the Afghan police could allow a more 
positive impact of the SSR on state-building. Rafiee summarises that the “people 
do not want insecurity and war, they want an inclusive process” (interview 
05/07/2012). The police could create the secure space for such a process to take 
place. A first important step for the Afghan people would be the possibility to 
leave their houses without the danger of becoming victims of crime and attacks. 
This requires a less militarised training and design of the ANP in order to create a 
police the population is not afraid of but which can make sure “that people are not 
carrying RPGs in the middle of the road at downtown Kabul” (Najafizada, 
interview 04/07/2012). Increasing the number of police officers is not sufficient 
and can even result in the opposite of what is intended as having more armed 
people reduces the perceived security in the Afghan society (Wardak, interview 
05/07/2012). Rather the quality of the police officers has to be increased by better 
trainings which focus on human rights and community policing (Farid Hamidi, 
interview 24/07/2012). Higher salaries are necessary for lower-ranked officers in 
                                               Page 35 of 47                                                 
 
 
 
order to reduce their reliance on bribes. The EUPOL mission certainly contributes 
positively, however, is too small to achieve lasting changes on a bigger scale. In 
order to enable the SSR to contribute to state-building in Afghanistan successfully 
the European mission has to be expanded by a large degree. Collaboration between 
society and police could further a human-centric concept of reforming the Afghan 
police. A good example was set by the Afghan Civil Society Forum Organization 
which introduced a neighbourhood committee in District 1 of Kabul (see 
Appendix for a map of the districts) in 2007 in order to reduce child prostitution 
(Rafiee, interview 05/07/2012). This committee allowed members of the 
neighbourhood and the police to meet on a regular basis to define roles, build trust 
and share information (ibid.). In addition, human rights trainings were provided 
for the police officers of the district. Even though the original goal of reducing 
child prostitution was not achieved it improved trust and reduced corruption 
(ibid.). Due to this success the approach has been duplicated in seven more 
districts and was finally adopted by UNDP in 2009 which has been extending the 
idea to a growing number of districts since then (ibid.). A success factor of this 
approach is certainly that society is directly involved in reforming the police. This 
makes the forces more embedded in society and creates political legitimacy. 
Ideally, however, a human-centric approach should not be restricted to reforming 
the police but should be adopted in a holistic way for all components of the 
security sector. Even though, for example, the military certainly requires a more 
extensive knowledge of weapons a human-centric guiding principle can ensure 
that collateral damage is not accepted as a necessary evil. A possibly resulting 
improved security situation further opens up space and allows society to become 
involved in discussing how other institutions should be designed.  
 
If the Afghan civil society had the freedom to become involved in a more 
endogenous process of state-building the Afghan institutions could look different. 
Afghans do not generally oppose the existence of a state and do not reject 
democracy but are critical about the Western model and rather want institutions 
which are embedded in tradition, religion and culture (Theros/Kaldor 2011:12). 
For example, Theros and Kaldor as well as Roy point out four likely determinants 
of a legitimate Afghan state: independent, Muslim, providing minimal services 
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without interfering in daily life and acting as a broker between local groups 
(Theros/Kaldor 2011:10; Roy 2003). In the present circumstances of a persisting 
focus on state-security, however, the Afghan society has no means to become 
involved and build a state which reflects their understanding of legitimate 
institutions.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
It can be concluded that the dominant focus on state security in reforming the 
Afghan police has contributed to delegitimising the Afghan state and continuously 
restricts the space for civil society to become involved in the state-building 
process. Even though the EU assists in ensuring security for the people its 
approach is overshadowed due to the comparatively low funding and number of 
instructors. In contrast, the USA is the main player of the state-security approach 
providing a training which narrowly focuses on weaponry and paramilitary 
training of the ANP. The technocratic attempt of creating the ALP has strengthened 
warlords and increased their oppressive capacity. As the police cannot ensure 
protection for the people Afghans experience insecurity, which reinforces the 
distrust in the state and its institutions and complicates any contribution to state-
building. Thus the state lacks political legitimacy and is detached from society, 
creating a gap between state and people.  
 
In order to increase the political legitimacy of the Afghan state people need to be 
given a secure space where they can discuss the rules that govern relations. The 
result might look very different to the current institutions but will reflect the 
interests of society. This requires the international community to support inclusive 
human-centric approaches. Police officers need a much more extensive training 
which has to be designed in cooperation with civil society organisations and 
should focus on human rights and literacy rather than handling weaponry only. Yet 
the human-centric approach should not be restricted to the police but include all 
components of the security sector. However, as the result of this approach to state-
building cannot be foreseen and planned and is also likely to need a long period of 
time it is certainly more difficult to implement in the foreign policy of the 
involved international actors which also have to acknowledge domestic interests.  
 
The police reform in Afghanistan confirms the assumption that a focus on state 
security in SSR contributes negatively to state-building on the long term and 
predominantly fulfils the interests of elites and outside actors. It reflects a 
Weberian understanding and tries to achieve legitimacy by improved performance 
                                               Page 38 of 47                                                 
 
 
 
through rational-legal institutions which substitute informal ones. However, this 
approach neglects that institutions also need political acceptance because 
otherwise they would be nothing more but a Western façade. In contrast, a stronger 
focus on human security in SSR appears to be more likely to contribute to a more 
inclusive as well as holistic and therefore on the long-term more successful form 
of state-building as it can create space for an endogenous process of building 
institutions which are embedded in and accepted by society. However, the 
evidence provided in this paper is only suggestive as it is restricted to one case 
study, Afghanistan, which is dominated by a state security conception. In order to 
gain a better understanding of the chances a human security approach can provide 
further research is required analysing other contexts different from Afghanistan 
also considering possibly more successful examples of SSR and state-building. 
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Appendix  
A. Districts of Kabul 
 
See hard copy.  
Due to the maximum size of 2MB for files at Moodle this part of the Appendix is 
not attached here.
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B. List of Interviewees 
 
No  Last Name, Name – Position – Organisation – Date of Interview 
1 anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012 
2 anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012 
3 anonymous – official – EUPOL – 01/07/2012 
4 anonymous – official – Project Implementation Unit (PIU), Support to 
Police Reform (GIZ) – 04/07/2012 
5 Najafizada, Lofullah – Head of Current Affairs – Tolo News, Moby Media 
Group – 04/07/2012 
6 Niazi, Mohammad Saeed – Director – Civil Society Development Center – 
04/07/2012 
7 Rafiee, Aziz – Executive Director – Afghanistan Civil Society Forum 
organization (ACSFo) – 05/07/2012 
8 Wardak, Mirwais – Managing Director – Peace Training and Research 
Organization (PTRO) – 05/07/2012  
9 Reid, David – Senior Vice President – Ariana Television Network (ATN) – 
05/07/2012 
10 Farid Hamidi, Mohammad – Commissioner – Independent Human Rights 
Commission – 24/07/2012 (on the phone) 
